The Competitiveness of Nations in a Global Knowledge-Based Economy


Walter Lippman

Public Opinion

MacMillan, NYC, 1960 (© 1922) pp.3-31




THERE is an island in the ocean where in 1914 a few Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Germans lived.  No cable reaches that island, and the British mail steamer comes but once in sixty days.  In September it had not yet come, and the islanders were still talking about the latest newspaper which told about the approaching trial of Madame Caillaux for the shooting of Gaston Calmette.  It was, therefore, with more than usual eagerness that the whole colony assembled at the quay on a day in mid-September to hear from the captain what the verdict had been.  They learned that for over six weeks now those of them who were English and those of them who were French had been fighting in behalf of the sanctity of treaties against those of them who were Germans.  For six strange weeks they had acted as if they were friends, when in fact they were enemies.

But their plight was not so different from that of most of the population of Europe.  They had been mistaken for six weeks, on the continent the interval may have been only six days or six hours. There was


an interval.  There was a moment when the picture of Europe on which men were conducting their business as usual, did not in any way correspond to the Europe which was about to make a jumble of their lives.  There was a time for each man when he was still adjusted to an environment that no longer existed.  All over the world as late as July 25th men were making goods that they would not be able to ship, buying goods they would not be able to import, careers were being planned, enterprises contemplated, hopes and expectations entertained, all in the belief that the world as known was the world as it was.  Men were writing books describing that world.  They trusted the picture in their heads.  And then over four years later, on a Thursday morning, came the news of an armistice, and people gave vent to their unutterable relief that the slaughter was over.  Yet in the five days before the real armistice came, though the end of the war had been celebrated, several thousand young men died on the battlefields.

Looking back we can see how indirectly we know the environment in which nevertheless we live.  We can see that the news of it comes to us now fast, now slowly; but that whatever we believe to be a true picture, we treat as if it were the environment itself.  It is harder to remember that about the beliefs upon which we are now acting, but in respect to other peoples and other ages we flatter ourselves that it is easy to see when they were in deadly earnest about ludicrous pictures of the world.  We insist, because of our superior hindsight, that the world as they needed to know it, and the world as they did know it, were


often two quite contradictory things.  We can see, too, that while they governed and fought, traded and reformed in the world as they imagined it to be, they produced results, or failed to produce any, in the world as it was.  They started for the Indies and found America.  They diagnosed evil and hanged old women.  They thought they could grow rich by always selling and never buying.  A caliph, obeying what he conceived to be the Will of Allah, burned the library at Alexandria.

Writing about the year 389, St. Ambrose stated the case for the prisoner in Plato’s cave who resolutely declines to turn his head.  “To discuss the nature and position of the earth does not help us in our hope of the life to come.  It is enough to know what Scripture states.  ‘That He hung up the earth upon nothing’ (Job xxvi. 7).  Why then argue whether He hung it up in air or upon the water, and raise a controversy as to how the thin air could sustain the earth; or why, if upon the waters, the earth does not go crashing down to the bottom?  Not because the earth is in the middle, as if suspended on even balance, but because the majesty of God constrains it by the law of His will, does it endure stable upon the unstable and the void.” 1

It does not help us in our hope of the life to come.  It is enough to know what Scripture states.  Why then argue?  But a century and a half after St. Ambrose, opinion was still troubled, on this occasion by the problem of the antipodes. A monk

1 Hexaëmeron, i. cap 6, quoted in The Mediaeval Mind, by Henry Osborn Taylor, Vol. 1, p. 73.


named Cosmas, famous for his scientific attainments, was therefore deputed to write a Christian Topography, or “Christian Opinion concerning the World.” 1  It is clear that he knew exactly what was expected of him, for he based all his conclusions on the Scriptures as he read them.  It appears, then, that the world is a flat parallelogram, twice as broad from east to west as it is long from north to south.  In the center is the earth surrounded by ocean, which is in turn surrounded by another earth, where men lived before the deluge.  This other earth was Noah’s port of embarkation.  In the north is a high conical mountain around which revolve the sun and moon.  When the sun is behind the mountain it is night. The sky is glued to the edges of the outer earth.  It consists of four high walls which meet in a concave roof, so that the earth is the floor of the universe.  There is an ocean on the other side of the sky, constituting the “waters that are above the firmament.”  The space between the celestial ocean and the ultimate roof of the universe belongs to the blest.  The space between the earth and sky is inhabited by the angels.  Finally, since St. Paul said that all men are made to live upon the “face of the earth” how could they live on the back where the Antipodes are supposed to be?  “With such a passage before his eyes, a Christian, we are told, should not ‘even speak of the Antipodes.” 2

Far less should he go to the Antipodes; nor should any Christian prince give him a ship to try; nor

1 Lecky, Rationalism in Europe, Vol. 1, pp. 276-8.

2. Id.


would any pious mariner wish to try.  For Cosmas there was nothing in the least absurd about his map.  Only by remembering his absolute conviction that this was the map of the universe can we begin to understand how he would have dreaded Magellan or Peary or the aviator who risked a collision with the angels and the vault of heaven by flying seven miles up in the air.  In the same way we can best understand the furies of war and politics by remembering that almost the whole of each party believes absolutely in its picture of the opposition, that it takes as fact, not what is, but what it supposes to be the fact.  And that therefore, like Hamlet, it will stab Polonius behind the rustling curtain, thinking him the king, and perhaps like Hamlet add:

“Thou wretched, rash, intruding fool, farewell!

I took thee for thy better; take thy fortune.”

Great men, even during their lifetime, are usually known to the public only through a fictitious personality.  Hence the modicum of truth in the old saying that no man is a hero to his valet.  There is only a modicum of truth, for the valet, and the private secretary, are often immersed in the fiction themselves.  Royal personages are, of course, constructed personalities.  Whether they themselves believe in their public character, or whether they merely permit the chamberlain to stage-manage it, there are at least two distinct selves, the public and regal self, the private and human.  The biographies of great people fail more or less readily into the histories of these two


selves.  The official biographer reproduces the public life, the revealing memoir the other.  The Charnwood Lincoln, for example, is a noble portrait, not of an actual human being, but of an epic figure, replete with significance, who moves on much the same level of reality as Aeneas or St. George.  Oliver’s Hamilton is a majestic abstraction, the sculpture of an idea, “an essay” as Mr. Oliver himself calls it, “on American union.”  It is a formal monument to the state-craft of federalism, hard1y the biography of a person.  Sometimes people create their own façade when they think they are revealing the interior scene.  The Repington diaries and Margot Asquith’s are a species of self-portraiture in which the intimate detail is most revealing as an index of how the authors like to think about themselves.

But the most interesting kind of portraiture is that which arises spontaneously in people’s minds.  When Victoria came to the throne, says Mr. Strachey,’1 “among the outside public there was a great wave of enthusiasm.  Sentiment and romance were coming into fashion; and the spectacle of the little girl-queen, innocent, modest, with fair hair and pink cheeks, driving through her capital, filled the hearts of the beholders with raptures of affectionate loyalty.  What, above all, struck everybody with overwhelming force was the contrast between Queen Victoria and her uncles.  The nasty old men, debauched and selfish, pigheaded and ridiculous, with their perpetual burden of debts, confusions, and disreputabilities—they had vanished like the snows of winter

1. Lytton Strachey, Queen Victoria, p.72.


and here at last, crowned and radiant, was the spring.”

M. Jean de Pierrefeu 1 saw hero-worship at first hand, for he was an officer on Joffre’s staff at the moment of that soldier’s greatest fame:

“For two years, the entire world paid an almost divine homage to the victor of the Marne.  The baggage-master literally bent under the weight of the boxes, of the packages and letters which unknown people sent him with a frantic testimonial of their admiration.  I think that outside of General Joffre, no commander in the war has been able to realize a comparable idea of what glory is.  They sent him boxes of candy from all the great confectioners of the world, boxes of champagne, fine wines of every vintage, fruits, game, ornaments and utensils, clothes, smoking materials, inkstands, paperweights.  Every territory sent its speciality.  The painter sent his picture, the sculptor his statuette, the dear old lady a comforter or socks, the shepherd in his hut carved a pipe for his sake.  All the manufacturers of the world who were hostile to Germany shipped their products, Havana its cigars, Portugal its port wine.  I have known a hairdresser who had nothing better to do than to make a portrait of the General out of hair belonging to persons who were dear to him; a professional penman had the same idea, but the features were composed of thousands of little phrases in tiny characters which sang the praise of the General.  As to letters, he had them in all scripts, from all countries, written in every dialect, affectionate letters, grateful, overflowing with love, filled with adoration.  They called him Savior of the World, Father of his Country, Agent of God, Benefactor of Humanity, etc. . .

1. Jean de Pierrefeu, G.Q.G Trois ans au Grand Quartier General, pp. 94-95.


And not only Frenchmen, but Americans, Argentinians, Australians, etc. etc. . . .  Thousands of little children, without their parents’ knowledge, took pen in hand and wrote to tell him their love: most of them called him Our Father.  And there was poignancy about their effusions, their adoration, these sighs of deliverance that escaped from thousands of hearts at the defeat of barbarism.  To all these naif little souls, Joffre seemed like St. George crushing the dragon.  Certainly he incarnated for the conscience of mankind the victory of good over evil, of light over darkness.

Lunatics, simpletons, the half-crazy and the crazy turned their darkened brains toward him as toward reason itself.  I have read the letter of a person living in Sydney, who begged the General to save him from his enemies; another, a New Zealander, requested him to send some soldiers to the house of a gentleman who owed him ten pounds and would not pay.

Finally, some hundreds of young girls, overcoming the timidity of their sex, asked for engagements, their families not to know about it; others wished only to serve him.”

This ideal Joffre was compounded out of the victory won by him, his staff and his troops, the despair of the war, the personal sorrows, and the hope of future victory.  But beside hero-worship there is the exorcism of devils.  By the same mechanism through which heroes are incarnated, devils are made.  If everything good was to come from Joffre, Foch, Wilson, or Roosevelt, everything evil originated in the Kaiser Wilhelm, Lenin and Trotsky.  They were as omnipotent for evil as the heroes were omnipotent for good.  To many simple and frightened minds there was no political reverse, no strike, no obstruc-


tion, no mysterious death or mysterious conflagration anywhere in the world of which the causes did not wind back to these personal sources of evil.

Worldwide concentration of this kind on a symbolic personality is rare enough to be clearly remarkable, and every author has a weakness for the striking and irrefutable example.  The vivisection of war reveals such examples, but it does not make them out of nothing.  In a more normal public life, symbolic pictures are no less governant of behavior, but each symbol is far less inclusive because there are so many competing ones.  Not only is each symbol charged with less feeling because at most it represents only a part of the population, but even within that part there is infinitely less suppression of individual difference.  The symbols of public opinion, in times of moderate security, are subject to check and comparison and argument.  They come and go, coalesce and are forgotten, never organizing perfectly the emotion of the whole group.  There is, after all, just one human activity left in which whole populations accomplish the union sacrée.  It occurs in those middle phases of a war when fear, pugnacity, and hatred have secured complete dominion of the spirit, either to crush every other instinct or to enlist it, and before weariness is felt.

At almost all other times and even in war when it is deadlocked, a sufficiently greater range of feelings is aroused to establish conflict, choice, hesitation, and compromise.  The symbolism of public opinion


usually bears, as we shall see,1 the marks of this balancing of interest.  Think, for example, of how rapidly, after the armistice, the precarious and by no means successfully established symbol of Allied Unity disappeared, how it was followed almost immediately by the breakdown of each nation’s symbolic picture of the other:  Britain the Defender of Public Law, France watching at the Frontier of Freedom, America the Crusader.  And think then of how within each nation the symbolic picture of itself frayed out, as party and class conflict and personal ambition began to stir postponed issues.  And then of how the symbolic pictures of the leaders gave way, as one by one, Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, ceased to be the incarnation of human hope, and became merely the negotiators and administrators for a disillusioned world.

Whether we regret this as one of the soft evils of peace or applaud it as a return to sanity is obviously no matter here.  Our first concern with fictions and symbols is to forget their value to the existing social order, and to think of them simply as an important part of the machinery of human communication.  Now in any society that is not completely self-contained in its interests and so small that everyone can know all about everything that happens, ideas deal with events that are out of sight and hard to grasp.  Miss Sherwin of Gopher Prairie,2 is aware that a war is raging in France and tries to conceive it.  She has never been to France, and certainly she has never been along what is now the battlefront.

1. Part V

2 See Sinclair Lewis, Main Street.


Pictures of French and German soldiers she has seen, but it is impossible for her to imagine three million men.  No one, in fact, can imagine them, and the professionals do not try.  They think of them as, say, two hundred divisions.  But Miss Sherwin has no access to the order of battle maps, and so if she is to think about the war, she fastens upon Joffre and the Kaiser as if they were engaged in a personal duel.  Perhaps if you could see what she sees with her mind’s eye, the image in its composition might be not unlike an Eighteenth Century engraving of a great soldier.  He stands there boldly unruffled and more than life size, with a shadowy army of tiny little figures winding off into the landscape behind.  Nor it seems are great men oblivious to these expectations.  M. de Pierrefeu tells of a photographer’s visit to Joffre.  The General was in his “middle class office, before the worktable without papers, where he sat down to write his signature.  Suddenly it was noticed that there were no maps on the walls.  But since according to popular ideas it is not possible to think of a general without maps, a few were placed in position for the picture, and removed soon afterwards.” 1

The only feeling that anyone can have about an event he does not experience is the feeling aroused by his mental image of that event.  That is why until we know what others think they know, we cannot truly understand their acts.  I have seen a young girl, brought up in a Pennsylvania mining town, plunged suddenly from entire cheerfulness into a

1. Op. cit, p. 99


paroxysm of grief when a gust of wind cracked the kitchen window-pane.  For hours she was inconsolable, and to me incomprehensible.  But when she was able to talk, it transpired that if a windowpane broke it meant that a close relative had died.  She was, therefore, mourning for her father, who had frightened her into running away from home.  The father was, of course, quite thoroughly alive as a telegraphic inquiry soon proved.  But until the telegram came, the cracked glass was an authentic message to that girl.  Why it was authentic only a prolonged investigation by a skilled psychiatrist could show.  But even the most casual observer could see that the girl, enormously upset by her family troubles, had hallucinated a complete fiction out of one external fact, a remembered superstition, and a turmoil of remorse, and fear and love for her father.

Abnormality in these instances is only a matter of degree.  When an Attorney-General, who has been frightened by a bomb exploded on his doorstep, convinces himself by the reading of revolutionary literature that a revolution is to happen on the first of May 1920, we recognize that much the same mechanism is at work.  The war, of course, furnished many examples of this pattern: the casual fact, the creative imagination, the will to believe, and out of these three elements, a counterfeit of reality to which there was a violent instinctive response.  For it is clear enough that under certain conditions men respond as powerfully to fictions as they do to realities, and that in many cases they help to create the very fictions to which they respond.  Let him cast the


first stone who did not believe in the Russian army that passed through England in August, 1914, did not accept any tale of atrocities without direct proof, and never saw a plot, a traitor, or a spy where there was none.  Let him cast a stone who never passed on as the real inside truth what he had heard someone say who knew no more than he did.

In all these instances we must note particularly one common factor.  It is the insertion between man and his environment of a pseudo-environment.  To that pseudo-environment his behavior is a response.  But because it is behavior, the consequences, if they are acts, operate not in the pseudo-environment where the behavior is stimulated, but in the real environment where action eventuates.  If the behavior is not a practical act, but what we call roughly thought and emotion, it may be a long time before there is any noticeable break in the texture of the fictitious world.  But when the stimulus of the pseudo-fact results in action on things or other people, contradiction soon develops.  Then comes the sensation of butting one’s head against a stone wall, of learning by experience, and witnessing Herbert Spencer’s tragedy of the murder of a Beautiful Theory by a Gang of Brutal Facts, the discomfort in short of a maladjustment.  For certainly, at the level of social life, what is called the adjustment of man to his environment takes place through the medium of fictions.

By fictions I do not mean lies. I mean a representation of the environment which is in lesser or greater degree made by man himself.  The range of fiction


extends all the way from complete hallucination to the scientists’ perfectly self-conscious use of a schematic model, or his decision that for his particular problem accuracy beyond a certain number of decimal places is not important.  A work of fiction may have almost any degree of fidelity, and so long as the degree of fidelity can be taken into account, fiction is not misleading.  In fact, human culture is very largely the selection, the rearrangement, the tracing of patterns upon, and the stylizing of, what William James called “the random irradiations and resettlements of our ideas.”1  The alternative to the use of fictions is direct exposure to the ebb and flow of sensation.  That is not a real alternative, for however refreshing it is to see at times with a perfectly innocent eye, innocence itself is not wisdom, though a source and corrective of wisdom.

For the real environment is altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance.  We are not equipped to deal with so much subtlety, so much variety, so many permutations and combinations.  And although we have to act in that environment, we have to reconstruct it on a simpler model before we can manage with it.  To traverse the world men must have maps of the world.  Their persistent difficulty is to secure maps on which their own need, or someone else’s need, has not sketched in the coast of Bohemia.

The analyst of public opinion must begin then, by recognizing the triangular relationship between the

1. James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. II, p. 638.


scene of action, the human picture of that scene, and the human response to that picture working itself out upon the scene of action.  It is like a play suggested to the actors by their own experience, in which the plot is transacted in the real lives of the actors, and not merely in their stage parts.  The moving picture often emphasizes with great skill this double drama of interior motive and external behavior.  Two men are quarreling, ostensibly about some money, but their passion is inexplicable.  Then the picture fades out and what one or the other of the two men sees with his mind’s eye is reënacted.  Across the table they were quarre1ing about money.  In memory they are back in their youth when the girl jilted him for the other man.  The exterior drama is explained: the hero is not greedy; the hero is in love.

A scene not so different was played in the United States Senate.  At breakfast on the morning of September 29, 1919, some of the Senators read a news dispatch in the Washington Post about the landing of American marines on the Dalmatian coast.  The newspaper said:


“The following important facts appear already established.  The orders to Rear Admiral Andrews commanding the American naval forces in the Adriatic, came from the British Admiralty via the War Council and Rear Admiral Knapps in London.  The approval or disapproval of the American Navy Department was not asked.



“Mr. Daniels was admittedly placed in a peculiar position when cables reached here stating that the forces over which he is presumed to have exclusive control were carrying on what amounted to naval warfare without his knowledge.  It was fully realized that the British Admiralty might desire to issue orders to Rear Admiral Andrews to act on behalf of Great Britain and her Allies, because the situation required sacrifice on the part of some nation if D’Annunzio’s followers were to be held in check.

“It was further realized that under the new league of nations plan foreigners would be in a position to direct American Naval forces in emergencies with or without the consent of the American Navy Department. . . .“ etc. (Italics mine).

The first Senator to comment is Mr. Knox of Pennsylvania.  Indignantly he demands investigation.  In Mr. Brandegee of Connecticut, who spoke next, indignation has already stimulated credulity.  Where Mr. Knox indignantly wishes to know if the report is true, Mr. Brandegee, a half a minute later, would like to know what would have happened if marines had been killed.  Mr. Knox, interested in the question, forgets that he asked for an inquiry, and replies.  If American marines had been killed, it would be war.  The mood of the debate is still conditional.  Debate proceeds.  Mr. McCormick of Illinois reminds the Senate that the Wilson administration is prone to the waging of small unauthorized wars.  He repeats Theodore Roosevelt’s quip about “waging peace.”  More debate. Mr. Brandegee notes that the marines


acted “under orders of a Supreme Council sitting somewhere,” but he cannot recall who represents the United States on that body.  The Supreme Council is unknown to the Constitution of the United States.  Therefore Mr. New of Indiana submits a resolution calling for the facts.

So far the Senators still recognize vaguely that they are discussing a rumor.  Being lawyers they still remember some of the forms of evidence.  But as red-blooded men they already experience all the indignation which is appropriate to the fact that American marines have been ordered into war by a foreign government and without the consent of Congress.  Emotionally they want to believe it, because they are Republicans fighting the League of Nations.  This arouses the Democratic leader, Mr. Hitchcock of Nebraska.  He defends the Supreme Council: it was acting under the war powers.  Peace has not yet been concluded because the Republicans are delaying it.  Therefore the action was necessary and legal.  Both sides now assume that the report is true, and the conclusions they draw are the conclusions of their partisanship.  Yet this extraordinary assumption is in a debate over a resolution to investigate the truth of the assumption.  It reveals how difficult it is, even for trained lawyers, to suspend response until the returns are in.  The response is instantaneous.  The fiction is taken for truth because the fiction is badly needed.

A few days later an official report showed that the marines were not landed by order of the British Government or of the Supreme Council. They had


not been fighting the Italians.  They had been landed at the request of the Italian Government to protect Italians, and the American commander had been officially thanked by the Italian authorities.  The marines were not at war with Italy.  They had acted according to an established international practice which had nothing to do with the League of Nations.

The scene of action was the Adriatic.  The picture of that scene in the Senators’ heads at Washington was furnished, in this case probably with intent to deceive, by a man who cared nothing about the Adriatic, but much about defeating the League.  To this picture the Senate responded by a strengthening of its partisan differences over the League.

Whether in this particular case the Senate was above or below its normal standard, it is not necessary to decide.  Nor whether the Senate compares favorably with the House, or with other parliaments.  At the moment, I should like to think only about the world-wide spectacle of men acting upon their environment, moved by stimuli from their pseudo-environments.  For when full allowance has been made for deliberate fraud, political science has still to account for such facts as two nations attacking one another, each convinced that it is acting in self-defense, or two classes at war each certain that it speaks for the common interest.  They live, we are likely to say, in different worlds.  More accurately, they live in the same world, but they think and feel in different ones.


It is to these special worlds, it is to these private or group, or class, or provincial, or occupational, or national, or sectarian artifacts, that the political adjustment of mankind in the Great Society takes place.  Their variety and complication are impossible to describe.  Yet these fictions determine a very great part of men’s political behavior.  We must think of perhaps fifty sovereign parliaments consisting of at least a hundred legislative bodies.  With them belong at least fifty hierarchies of provincial and municipal assemblies, which with their executive, administrative and legislative organs, constitute formal authority on earth.  But that does not begin to reveal the complexity of political life.  For in each of these innumerable centers of authority there are parties, and these parties are themselves hierarchies with their roots in classes, sections, cliques and clans; and within these are the individual politicians, each the personal center of a web of connection and memory and fear and hope.

Somehow or other, for reasons often necessarily obscure, as the result of domination or compromise or a logroll, there emerge from these political bodies commands, which set armies in motion or make peace, conscript life, tax, exile, imprison, protect property or confiscate it, encourage one kind of enterprise and discourage another, facilitate immigration or obstruct it, improve communication or censor it, establish schools, build navies, proclaim “policies,” and “destiny,” raise economic barriers, make property or unmake it, bring one people under the rule of another, or favor one class as against


another.  For each of these decisions some view of the facts is taken to be conclusive, some view of the circumstances is accepted as the basis of inference and as the stimulus of feeling.  What view of the facts, and why that one?

And yet even this does not begin to exhaust the real complexity.  The formal political structure exists in a social environment, where there are innumerable large and small corporations and institutions, voluntary and semi-voluntary associations, national, provincial, urban and neighborhood groupings, which often as not make the decision that the political body registers.  On what are these decisions based?

“Modern society,” says Mr. Chesterton, “is intrinsically insecure because it is based on the--notion that all men will do the same thing for different reasons . . . . And as within the head of any convict may be the hell of a quite solitary crime, so in the house or under the hat of any suburban clerk may be the limbo of a quite separate philosophy.  The first man may be a complete Materialist and feel his own body as a horrible machine manufacturing his own mind.  He may listen to his thoughts as to the dull ticking of a clock.  The man next door may be a Christian Scientist and regard his own body as somehow rather less substantial than his own shadow.  He may come almost to regard his own arms and legs as delusions like moving serpents in the dream of delirium tremens.  The third man in the street may not be a Christian Scientist but, on the contrary, a Christian.  He may live in a fairy tale as his neighbors would say; a secret but solid fairy tale full of the


faces and presences of unearthly friends.  The fourth man may be a theosophist, and only too probably a vegetarian; and I do not see why I should not gratify myself with the fancy that the fifth man is a devil worshiper. . . . Now whether or not this sort of variety is valuable, this sort of unity is shaky.  To expect that all men for all time will go on thinking different things, and yet doing the same things, is a doubtful speculation.  It is not.founding society on a communion, or even a convention, but rather on a coincidence.  Four men may meet under the same lamp post; one to paint it pea green as part of great municipal reform; one to read his breviary in the light of it; one to embrace it with accidental ardour in a lit of alcoholic enthusiasm; and the last merely because the pea green post is a conspicuous point of rendezvous with his young lady.  But to expect this to happen night after night is unwise. . . 1

For the four men at the lamp post substitute the governments, the parties, the corporations, the societies, the social sets, the trades and professions, universities, sects, and nationalities of the world.  Think of the legislator voting a statute that will affect distant peoples, a statesman coming to a decision.  Think of the Peace Conference reconstituting the frontiers of Europe, an ambassador in a foreign country trying to discern the intentions of his own government and of the foreign government, a promoter working a concession in a backward country, an editor demanding a war, a clergyman calling on

1. G. K. Chesterton, “The Mad Hatter and the Sane Householder,” Vanity Fair, January, 1921, p. 54.



the police to regulate amusement, a club lounging-room making up its mind about a strike, a sewing circle preparing to regulate the schools, nine judges deciding whether a legislature in Oregon may fix the working hours of women, a cabinet meeting to decide on the recognition of a government, a party convention choosing a candidate and writing a platform, twenty-seven million voters casting their ballots, an Irishman in Cork thinking about an Irishman in Belfast, a Third International planning to reconstruct the whole of human: society, a board of directors confronted with a set of their employees’ demands, a boy choosing a career, a merchant estimating supply and demand for the coming season, a speculator predicting the course of the market, a banker deciding whether to put credit behind a new enterprise, the advertiser, the reader of advertisments. . . .Think of the different sorts of Americans thinking about their notions of “The British Empire” or “France” or “Russia” or “Mexico.”  It is not so different from Mr. Chesterton’s four men at the pea green lamp post.

And so before we involve ourselves in the jungle of obscurities about the innate differences of men, we shall do well to fix our attention upon the extraordinary differences in what men know of the world.1  I do not doubt that there are important biological differences.  Since man is an animal it would be strange if there were not.  But as rational beings it


is worse than shallow to generalize at all about comparative behavior until there is a measurable similarity between .the environments to which behavior is a response. -

The pragmatic value of this idea is that it introduces a much needed refinement into the ancient controversy about nature and nurture, innate quality and environment.  For the pseudo-environment is a hybrid compounded of “human nature” and “conditions.”  To my mind it shows the uselessness of pontificating about what man is and always will be from what we observe man to be doing, or about what are the necessary conditions of society.  For we do not know how men would behave in response to the facts of the Great Society.  All that we really know is how they behave in response to what can fairly be called a most inadequate picture of the Great Society.  No conclusion about man or the Great Society can honestly be made on evidence like that.

This, then, will be the clue to our inquiry.  We shall assume that what each man does is based not on direct and certain knowledge, but on pictures made by himself or given to him.  If his atlas tells him that the world is flat he will not sail near what he believes to be the edge of our planet for fear of falling off.  If his maps include a fountain of eternal youth, a Ponce de Leon will go in quest of it.  If someone digs up yellow dirt that looks like gold, he will for a time act exactly as if he had found gold.  The way in which the world is imagined determines at any particular moment what men will do.  It does not



determine what they will achieve.  It determines their effort, their feelings, their hopes, not their accomplishments and results.  The very men who most loudly proclaim their “materialism” and their contempt for “ideologues,” the Marxian communists, place their entire hope on what?  On the formation by propaganda of a class-conscious group.  But what is propaganda if not the effort to alter the picture to which men respond, to substitute one social pattern for another?  What is class consciousness but a way of realizing the world?  National consciousness but another way?  And Professor Giddings’ consciousness of kind, but a process of believing that we recognize among the multitude certain ones marked as our kind?

Try to explain social life as the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain.  You will soon be saying that the hedonist begs the question, for even supposing that man does pursue these ends, the crucial problem of why he thinks one course rather than another likely to produce pleasure, is untouched.  Does the guidance of man’s conscience explain?  How then does he happen to have the particular conscience which he has?  The theory of economic self-interest?  But how do men come to conceive their interest in one way rather than another?  The desire for security, or prestige, or domination, or what is vaguely called self-realization?  How do men conceive their security, what do they consider prestige, how do they figure out the means of domination, or what is the notion of self which they wish to realize?  Pleasure, pain, conscience, acquisition, protection,



enhancement, mastery, are undoubtedly names for some of the ways people act.  There may be instinctive dispositions which work toward such ends.  But no statement of the end, or any description of the tendencies to seek it, can explain the behavior which results.  The very fact that men theorize at all is proof that their pseudo-environments, their interior representations of the world, are a determining element in thought, feeling, and action.  For if the connection between reality and human response were direct and immediate, rather than indirect and inferred, indecision and failure would be unknown, and (if each of us fitted as snugly into the world as the child in the womb), Mr Bernard Shaw would not have been able to say that except for the first nine months of its existence no human being manages its affairs as well as a plant.

The chief difficulty in adapting the psychoanalytic scheme to political thought arises in this connection.  The Freudians are concerned with the maladjustment of distinct individuals to other individuals and to concrete circumstances.  They have assumed that if internal derangements could be straightened out, there would be little or no confusion about what is the obviously normal relationship.  But public opinion deals with indirect, unseen, and puzzling facts, and there is nothing obvious about them.  The situations to which public opinions refer are known only as opinions.  The psychoanalyst, on the other hand, almost always assumes that the environment is knowable, and if not knowable then at least bearable, to any unclouded intelligence.  This assump-


tion of his is the problem of public opinion.  Instead of taking for granted an environment that is readily known, the social analyst is most concerned in studying how the larger political environment is conceived, and how it can be conceived more successfully.  The psychoanalyst examines the adjustment to an X, called by him the environment; the social analyst examines the X, called by him the pseudo-environment.

He is, of course, permanently and constantly in debt to the new psychology, not only because when rightly applied it so greatly helps people to stand on their own feet, come what may, but because the study of dreams, fantasy and rationalization has thrown light on how the pseudo-environment is put together.  But he cannot assume as his criterion either what is called a “normal biological career”1 within the existing social order, or a career “freed from religious suppression and dogmatic conventions” outside.2  What for a sociologist is a normal social career?  Or one freed from suppressions and conventions?  Conservative critics do, to be sure, assume the first, and romantic ones the second. But in assuming them they are taking the whole world for granted.  They are saying in effect either that society is the sort of thing which corresponds to their idea of what is normal, or the sort of thing which corresponds to their idea of what is free.  Both ideas are merely public opinions, and while the psychoanalyst as physician may perhaps assume them, the sociologist may not take the products of existing

1 Edward J. Kempf, Psychopathology,. p. 116.

2. Id., p. 151.


public opinion as criteria by which to study public opinion.

The world that we have to deal with politically is out of reach, out of sight, out of mind.  It has to be explored, reported, and imagined.  Man is no Aristotelian god contemplating all existence at one glance.  He is the creature of an evolution who can just about span a sufficient portion of reality to manage his survival, and snatch what on the scale of time are but a few moments of insight and happiness.  Yet this same creature has invented ways of seeing what no naked eye could see, of hearing what no ear couId hear, of weighing immense masses and infinitesimal ones, of counting and separating more items than he can individually remember.  He is learning to see with his mind vast portions of the world that he could never see, touch, smell, hear, or remember.  Gradually he makes for himself a trustworthy picture inside his head of the world beyond his reach.

Those features of the world outside which have to do with the behavior of other human beings, in so far as that behavior crosses ours, is dependent upon us, or is interesting to us, we call roughly public affairs.  The pictures inside the heads of these human beings, the pictures of themselves, of others, of their needs, purposes, and relationship, are their public opinions.  Those pictures which are acted upon by groups of people, or by individuals acting in the name of groups, are Public Opinion with capital letters.  And so in the chapters which follow we shall inquire


first into some of the reasons why the picture inside so often misleads men in their dealings with the world outside.  Under this heading we shall consider first the chief factors which limit their access to the facts.  They are the artificial censorships, the limitations of social contact, the comparatively meager time available in each day for paying attention to public affairs, the distortion arising because events have to be compressed into very short messages, the difficulty of making a small vocabulary express a complicated world, and finally the fear of facing those facts which would seem to threaten the established routine of men’s lives.

The analysis then turns from these more or less external limitations to the question of how this trickle of messages from the-outside is affected by the stored up images, the preconceptions, and prejudices which interpret, fill them out, and in their turn powerfully direct the play of our attention, and our vision itself.  From this it proceeds to examine how in the individual person the limited messages from outside, formed into a pattern of stereotypes, are identified with his own interests as he feels and conceives them.  In the succeeding sections it examines how opinions are crystallized into what is called Public Opinion, how a National Will, a Group Mind, a Social Purpose, or whatever you choose to call it, is formed.

The first five parts constitute the descriptive section of the book.  There follows an analysis of the traditional democratic theory of public opinion.  The substance of the argument is that democracy in its


original form never seriously faced the problem which arises because the pictures inside people’s heads do not automatically correspond with the world outside.  And then, because the democratic theory is under criticism by socialist thinkers, there follows an examination of the most advanced and coherent of these criticisms, as made by the English Guild Socialists.  My purpose here is to find out whether these reformers take into account the main difficulties of public opinion.  My conclusion is that they ignore the difficulties, as completely as did the original democrats, because they, too, assume, and in a much more complicated civilization, that somehow mysteriously there exists in the hearts of men a knowledge of the world beyond their reach.

I argue that representative government, either in what is ordinarily called politics, or in industry, cannot be worked successfully, no matter what the basis of election, unless there is an independent, expert organization for making the unseen facts intelligible to those who have to make the decisions.  I attempt, therefore, to argue that the serious acceptance of the principle that personal representation must be supplemented by representation of the unseen facts would alone permit a satisfactory decentralization, and allow us to escape from the intolerable and unworkable fiction that each of us must acquire a competent opinion about all public affairs.  It is argued that the problem of the press is confused because the critics and the apologists expect the press to realize this fiction, expect it to make up for all that was not foreseen in the theory of democ-


racy, and that the readers expect this miracle to be performed at no cost or trouble to themselves.  The newspapers are regarded by democrats as a panacea for their own defects, whereas analysis of the nature of news and of the economic basis of journalism seems to show that the newspapers necessarily and inevitably reflect, and therefore, in greater or lesser measure, intensify, the defective organization of public opinion.  My conclusion is that public opinions must be organized for the press if they are to be sound, not by the press as is the case today.  This organization I conceive to be in the first instance the task of a political science that has won its proper place as formulator, in advance of real decision, instead of apologist, critic, or reporter after the decision has been made.  I try to indicate that the perplexities of government and industry are conspiring to give political science this enormous opportunity to enrich itself and to serve the public.  And, of course, I hope that these pages will help a few people to realize that opportunity more vividly, and therefore to pursue it more consciously.