The Competitiveness of Nations in a Global Knowledge-Based Economy
Kurt
Hübner
Philosophy of Modern Art and Philosophy
of Technology
Techné, 4 (1), Fall 1998, 35-46
Content
4. Philosophies of Modern Art & Technology
HHC:
(titling added)
Art is something visible. But
everything we see we see under certain conditions. What are the conditions of what is visible in
art?
These conditions are, on the one hand, historical, and on the other
hand natural. The natural ones include
certain psychological laws of sight, for instance, the effects of colors,
optical illusions, etc. To the
historical ones belong, first, the material which is used - for instance, oil,
colors, and the canvas - second, a certain style, i.e., a certain system of
rules by which things visible are submitted a
priori. There is a general style,
for example, the style of Impressionism, and there is a particular style, for
example, the different and individual ways in which two painters, both
impressionists, paint.
Now the conditions of art are nothing but a certain way of interpreting
reality. To understand this the difference between the classical Greek and the
classical Egyptian style may serve as an example. For the Greeks the reality of the visible was
given by the perspective and the situation in which the object appears; for
that reason they presented a person in his individual movements. For the Egyptians, on the other hand, it was
only the appearance of a transitory moment which according to their opinion is
not really real; consequently, they searched for the permanent essence and the
typical character of an object. So for
the Egyptians Greek art was in truth illusion; for the Greeks, on the other
hand, Egyptian art was unrealistic constructivism (Gombrich,
1977).
This means: A style of art reveals not only a certain
historically given and historically changing relation to reality, but it is
also like a language. Whereas language
determines a priori by means of its
vocabulary and grammar, what we perceive of reality and how we can perceive it,
in art style determines a priori,
among other things, the way in which reality appears in its scope. And, due to this, people often learn to see a
landscape the way a famous artist sees it.
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However, the way in which reality appears in art must not be regarded
on its own. It is connected with many
other ways of recognizing reality, such as political, religious, economic,
intellectual, and social ways - in short, all the phenomena of human life. In other words, art is always the art of a
certain epoch, with its relation to and its conception of reality. Thus, we talk for example about the art of
ancient myth, about the art of medieval Christianity, and last but not least
about the art of the technological age. By
this we want to express that in these eras myth, Christianity, technology and
their different interpretations of reality were each
the center of the epoch.
This means that art makes visible objects and the contents of other
fields of experience of a certain epoch within the scope of its special
aprioristic conditions. That is, the
epoch’s “visible as such” is manifested through art, because in other fields of
experience we really do not regard objects and contents from the aspect of what
is visible but from the point of view of cognitively tangible aims for which
they are useful. So, for example, we
know where the house we want to visit is situated and we have a rough idea of
what it looks like, but its visible-as-such, which interests the artist, we do
not notice at all. Thus, objects and
contents in a certain historical cultural connection are reflected by art in
the proper artistic medium; i.e., they take shape under the a priori conditions of the artist’s
consideration of reality.
Consequently, it is paradoxical to understand art as some kind of copy
of the fields of experience connected with it. So, for example, it is not important for the
work of art as such if we compare the landscape of a painting with the
landscape which served the artist as his model. Even if the artist had tried to make what he
painted as similar as possible to the model he used - whatever that may mean - nevertheless,
the landscape which he saw is only the matter from which something completely
different emerges, since he has submitted its view to the a priori conditions of art: namely to the material used (colors,
canvas, etc.), to his style, and even to the fact that he paints on a plane
surface. Thus we must contemplate a work
of art by itself, and even if it is also connected with other fields of
experience it nevertheless displays something unique which appears in that
piece of art and only there. This is the
visible-as- such.
Also, the connection of art with objects and contents of different fields of
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experience must not be misunderstood, in the sense that art
should serve only their illustration. An
illustration does not exist per se
but serves something else, namely, the thing which it illustrates and which it
is aimed at. But the visible-as-such has
its aim in itself, and a work of art will not open up to us as a work of art if
we do not concentrate only on this quality of being visible that appears in it.
The previous considerations have shown that art is neither a copy
(mimesis in Plato’s view) nor a mere subjective aspect of reality as many
people still believe (see Vischer, 1889, or Adorno, 1970).
Every conception of reality is subjective in the sense that it is of
necessity founded on a priori
presuppositions; but it is nevertheless objective in the sense that these
presuppositions are not arbitrary but are rooted in a general historical
context. In this respect, there is no
principled or formal difference between the cognition of reality through art
and other cognitions of reality. If
somebody were to object by saying that the painting of a landscape is not real
because we cannot take a walk in it, we would have to reply that the reality of
the painted landscape is of a kind that we cannot walk in. In this respect, it is not an exception.
To summarize: In pictorial art the non-artistic cognition of reality is
turned into a specific cognition of reality which refers only to the
visible-as- such. In art, everything
takes on a visible form.
Now how can we develop a philosophy of modern art on these general
foundations? If art, as I have said, is
inextricably connected with the interpretations of reality of a certain epoch
and if the modern epoch is widely determined by technology, then art must
reflect in its particular medium that idea of reality which is at the bottom of
this modern, technological world. But
what does this idea of reality consist of? The response to this question is possible only
within the framework of a philosophy of technology. Thus, a philosophy of modern art requires not
only a general philosophy of art but also a general philosophy of technology. Now let us consider the latter.
First of all, we must keep in mind that it is not possible to speak of technology in general. As art has changed thoroughly in the course of history, so
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also has technology changed. The reason for this change is that the aims
which technology serves have changed by providing the material means for their
realization. We are not asking here
about this or that aim but rather about the system of aims which determines a
certain historical epoch. So, for
example, in antiquity this system was given by the needs of the state, of a
cult, and of art. Technology served
these needs. Indeed, this did not change
during the Middle Ages, though after Christianity abolished slavery and
therefore cheap labor was no longer available, the scope of technology was
extended enormously. Nevertheless, an
immensely more important revolution took place when technology not only served
a given system of aims but itself dictated this system to a great extent. This happened when technology was inextricably
connected with the exact sciences.
From the beginning of modern times the exact sciences worked with
technological equipment and in part used it to define science’s terms
operationally. On the other hand,
technology used cognitions of the natural sciences for products which by way of
feedback furthered knowledge in natural sciences. So what has fundamentally changed is the
complete theoretical penetration of technology which in former times was
completely unknown.
As a consequence of this theoretical penetration technology proceeded
in the course of a long development period not only to solve individual
practical questions but also to explore systematically the possibilities of
practical aims and their technological realization. From a theoretical viewpoint every
technological product turned out to be a transmission system. A transmission system is understood as the
transformation, governed by operators, of certain entities (those of input)
into certain other entities (those of output). In this way control, regulative, and matching
processes are produced, which in general we call feedback processes.
Generally it is a question of the conservation of states, the use of energy, and the acquisition of information. With regard to the conservation of states, the input factors are the modes of intervention by which states can be altered, whereas the resultant output factors are those states which have to be maintained or conserved (e.g., dikes, preservatives, or heating systems). Likewise in the use of energy we are dealing with a regulative process of transformation, namely, that of energy, and thus with a transmission system (automobiles, airplanes, etc.)
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Finally in
the acquisition of information, words (messages) are fed in, transformed into
electric waves, printed letters, punch cards, and the like, and then read out
again at the end as words (messages, for example in a computer).
Now the decisive point is that transmission systems can be described by
mathematical models. These models provide a systematic and theoretical exploration of technological possibilities,
in the following way.
First, by utilizing the model and disregarding the immediate purposes
and particular forms of the technical objects involved, we can explore the
scope and free play of the potential these objects may have. Here, the model merely serves the same purpose
as a theory in that it allows us to present individual phenomena as being
derivable from it and, by arranging and classifying these phenomena within a
large systematic context, we gain a clear overview of these elements of the
system.
Second, the structure of the transmission system formulated in terms of
mathematical models can be checked for possible reciprocal substitution by
other transmission systems. For
instance, when it has been determined that an isomorphic or homomorphic
relation exists between a technical and a natural transmission system - when
there is either complete or partial structural agreement - the technical system
will produce, either in full or in part, what is produced by the natural
transmission system.
Third and finally, beginning with given transmission systems we can
move - via combinations and variations, etc. - to the free construction of
other transmission systems on a multiplicity of different planes, so that we
can examine how these might be utilized practically.
We find these three levels of progressive abstraction and theorization
in numerous fields - for example, in switching theory, in the theory of
automata, in control or steering theory, in game theory, in the theory of
matching systems, in neuron models, in information theory.
In this way the system of aims underlying modern technology is defined. The essential point of this system is not, as in former times, that aims are prescribed to technology from the outside which it then has to realize - although
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this still happens today; its essential point is, on the
contrary, that technology devises aims on its own and systematically.
It is a fact, however we may try to explain
it, that modern technology, with the system of aims just characterized,
dominates our age. That does not only
mean that it produces, in its proper systematic manner, more and more new aims
- and that simultaneously it thrusts more and more traditional aims into the
background if it does not even make them totally disappear - but that also
means that as a result of technology reality is widely considered exclusively
from the point of view of its rationalizability and
of the unlimited progress of this rationalizability. Because, as has been shown, transmission
systems of technology are not only presentable in exact mathematical models and
have the same function as theories in the exact sciences; they are also
inextricably connected with these theories. And exactness always is rationality, even if
not everything rational is at the same time exact.
The impressive successes of technology not only continuously strengthened
this aspect of reality but they finally also caused the rise of the
epistemological dogma that science and technology offer the only access to
reality.
Now I will turn to a philosophy of modern art which is an art of the
technological age.
If, as I have said, the aim of art is to make visible-as-such contents
and objects of an idea of reality which is characteristic of a particular
historical epoch, then, if this is the case, the following question arises for
modern art. Which aspect of that kind
does a reality dominated by science and technology offer?
Before I go into this, I have to warn against a potential misunderstanding. By no means must art always be adjusted to a given concept of reality as is the case in the technological age. Although in antiquity the idea of reality was rooted in myth, art and myth presented an inseparable unity. On the other hand in the Renaissance art was to a certain degree predominant. Leonardo da Vinci may
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serve as an example. His
artistic exploration of nature was the origin of his studies in natural science
and technology. So the essential is only
the correlation between the artistic and the non-artistic aspects of reality.
Now in which manner has art answered the following question: which
artistic aspect does that reality which is dominated by science and technology
present? To answer this question we must
go back to the nineteenth century, and for that reason the philosophy of modern
art cannot be restricted to the present time.
Confronted with the claim made by science and technology that they are
in possession of the only access to reality, art at first switched over to the
subjective conditions of sight. This was
the origin of Impressionism. On the one hand these conditions of sight were
themselves an object of scientific-technological exploration, but on the other
hand art could grasp the visible as such
of that kind of sight. So for example
Pointillism as a version of Impressionism was based on certain scientific
theories of perception (I draw attention here to the theories of Helmholtz), where the object of perception is investigated
in a way in which it appears as freed from all its mythical, religious,
metaphysical, or other intellectual implications, and is allegedly seen in a
quasi pure view. Reality now falls into
two parts. On the one hand, that of the
objects of scientific and technological cognition, and, on the other hand, that
of the subjects as their perception of objects is itself the object of scientific
or technological research. In this
situation the task arises for art to expose the visible-as-such in those
perceptions, which on the other hand are objects of the exploration mentioned
above.
Another approach is taken by Cubism. Cubism does not consider reality, as Impressionism does, in the quasi-positivistic aspect of its purely sensual impression; on the contrary, it considers reality as the result of notions produced by rationality. For that reason Cubism is also called art conceptuel. It makes the object visible as a construct of thinking, not only showing what we can see directly but also what we complement by thinking: its volume, its surface, its elements, its back, etc. Nevertheless, Cubism also agrees with that idea of subjectivity which arises from the scientific-technological conception of reality. But, this time, the perceiving subjectivity is not meant, as in Impressionism, but a subjectivity that constructs objects by the process of rational thinking. Cubism is, so
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to speak, painting by the new “Cartesian man” as the man of
the technological age could be called. This painter wants to master nature, to see himself as its sovereign maitre
et possesseur; so Picasso can dare to commit the
monstrosity of transforming the face of a man deliberately, to paint it with
three eyes. In this sense Apollinaire could say that Cubism is scientific painting,
and Gleize could maintain that Cubism tries to make
visible the operations of thinking.
We find another variant of art which reacts to the scientific-technological
world in abstract painting and sculpture. Since the world of objects seems to be
completely occupied by a scientific-technological interpretation, art turns
completely away from that and turns to the contemplation of the internal
structures of subjectivity, making visible on the one hand the mental processes
of a pure rational constructivism as such (Malewitsch,
Kandinsky, Mondrian), and
making visible on the other hand the dynamics of the soul as it is guided by
the unconscious (Miró) - which too is an object of
scientific, in this case, psychological research.
But there is also an art in the technological age which is devoted to
objects - however, to objects which to a great extent are not part of nature
but are largely artificial. This is
called Pop Art. Its objects are
technical products, especially consumer articles. These objects present no problem of
interpretation or epistemology, like objects of nature where, for example, a
question arises whether their truth is given scientifically or technologically
or in some other way. As to technical
products, we mainly think about their use or the satisfaction of material
wishes, since the principles of their construction, as made by humans, include
no mystery. Consequently the style of
Pop Art has its origin in advertisements. Pop Art is enthusiastic about the glittering
of automobiles and airplanes, about the packaging of industrial products (food,
cigarettes, etc.). And whenever Pop Art
depicts humans, they are freed of all the burdens of myth, religion, and
metaphysics in the same way as the objects of technical production. Humans are presented as mass-produced articles
or shadowy figures. That is the way in
which pop-artists - like Warhol, Rosenquist, and Wesselmann - paint man and his world of advertisements.
But art reveals also the dark side of the technological age. By this I do not so much mean certain contents, as for instance criticism of social conditions, but rather styles; since, as I already said in introducing the philosophy of art in
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general, only by styles can contents be artistically
connected with the reality of the epoch. Would it not be paradoxical to try to present
a modern factory in the Baroque style? Among
styles which reveal the dark sides of the technological age, I would mention
Surrealism, Dadaism, and Expressionism.
Surrealism (e.g., in Dalí) tries to expose
the arrogant Cartesian homo technicus, by turning to the irrational of the human
soul, and for that purpose expressly using the theory of psychoanalysis. The psychoanalytical symbols of dreams require
symbolic forms and special effects of colors and light, which give the
impression of something mysterious, puzzling, and impenetrable.
Dadaism renders dubious the widespread dogma of the technological age,
that the world is principally an object of rational explanation. According to Dadaists, this dogma veils the
fact that reality is not only closed to a totally rational explanation, but is
also basically dominated by chance on the one hand and by individual things on
the other hand. These individual things
Dadaists believe to be in fact something absolutely concrete; the usual
cognitive and rational generalizations are nothing but mere fictions. Consequently, Dadaism tries to free objects
from all the rational connections with which they are surrounded, as in a
network, and thus to make them visible exactly in their pure facticity and fortuitousness. This is effected
mainly by the so-called objet trouvé; for
example, the toilet bowl that Duchamp removed from
its function, in such a way that it looked totally absurd. The style of the Dadaists consists of a
special rearranging of objects in a way that emphasizes their alienation.
In contrast to Dadaism, Expressionism presents the dark side of the technological age rather indirectly - namely, by displaying the lost paradise of myth, where man still experienced nature as something completely alive. (I use the word “Expressionism” here in a very broad sense, so that, for instance, the landscapes of van Gogh, Vlaminck, Nolde, Kirchner, and Schmidt-Rottluffs can be integrated in an all-embracing view, as different as they may be in detail.) Here all objects - a house, a mountain, a field, the sun, the sea, the trees and clouds - are related to man as living beings. Differences between the internal and external, the ideal and material, vanish in a typical mythical manner. And yet, even Expressionism bears the stamp of the technological age since its mythical view is really a protest, a revolt. What Expressionism claims to see is not a secured possession; consequently, its passionate, sometimes poster-like
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style - with glowing colors - may only reveal the effort to
revive something irrevocably lost.
Let us finally consider so-called Postmodern
art. This art too doubts the dogma that
the scientific-technological world is in possession of the only access to truth
and reality. But, for that very reason,
if Postmodern art does not regard the ideas of reality as rooted in the
European tradition of myth and religion as something absolutely remote and
strange, neither does it believe that these ideas could be actually revived. Therefore Postmodern art searches for a
synthesis of these opposites, a synthesis which the post-modern architect
Jencks has called double-coding. By
double-coding he means that something which, today, we actually cannot maintain
seriously any more is expressed in a manner that nevertheless can be generally
accepted. This happens by using the
thing, on the one hand, as a mere quotation, but on the other hand in such a
way that its character as a quotation is simultaneously neutralized. Correspondingly, Postmodern
art constantly shows quotations of past epochs of the history of art, but it
presents them with a certain irony and alienation, so that we are never sure
whether we really have to take it seriously or not. Jencks has convincingly demonstrated this by
examples of how it is effected. (I can just mention a Mariani painting of an allegory of Parnassus, but unfortunately
I cannot enter into this here in detail; see Jencks, 1986.)
4. Philosophies of Modern Art &
Technology
After this tour d´horizon, which of course can only provide a very short and a very incomplete sketch of modern art, let us come back to the general foundations of a philosophy of art. According to these foundations, art is neither a pure product of subjective imagination nor a mere copy of a reality outside (mimesis), but it is based on a peculiar way of considering reality. It actually is a consideration of reality, because like every way of considering reality it lets the world appear under certain a priori conditions. And it is a peculiar consideration of reality because these a priori conditions refer to a certain aspect of reality - namely, the visible-as-such, which at the same time is in correlation to other aspects of reality which are characteristic of a certain historical epoch. Art refers to these other aspects in a kind of uncertainty relation. As the results of the measuring of the momentum of a particle vanish if its position is measured, so in the same way cognitive aspects of reality are thrust into the background if they are
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displaced by the aspect of the visible-as-such and vice
versa.
Now such a philosophy of art presupposes two principles of a general
theory of cognition. First, cognition of
reality, of necessity, takes place under a
priori conditions. Second, it is
impossible to make a choice among different groups of a priori conditions of appearances (in the sense that some of them
could be regarded as the conditions of truth and reality, whereas others are
the conditions of deception and falsehood).
I cannot further discuss these principles here, but I would like to
refer to my book, Critique of Scientific
Reason (1983). Regarding the
objection of relativism, I want to remark here that it is not a question of
arbitrary but historically developing a
priori conditions, and such conditions are not applicable at will to the
same thing; they define and constitute completely different fields of reality -
for instance, those of art and those of science, even if these different fields
of reality are correlated to each other in the manner I have described.
It follows from the general principles of the theory of cognition that
we have to speak of different dimensions of reality, in short, of the
multidimensionality of reality (see Goodman, 1968). That means, in the case of art: On the one
hand, art generally discloses the dimension of the visible-as-such, which, for
example, vanishes in the uncertainty relation in those fields where cognitive
intentions are in the foreground. On the
other hand, art has a special way of disclosing this quality of being visible,
by showing it under the conditions of a given historical situation which itself
is characterized by a certain dimension of reality and by those a priori conditions which define this
dimension.
Now if the rise of modern art is indebted to an impression that the
idea of reality which dominates the technological age is either inescapable
(Impressionism, Cubism, and Surrealism), or that an opposition is only possible
by revolt (Dadaism) or longing (Expressionism), then the situation would be
fundamentally changed if artists would become aware of the multidimensionality
of reality. Is not Postmodern
art perhaps a first indication of that? (See Hubner, 1994.)
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Adorno. T. 1970. Aesthetische Theorie.
Gombrich,
E. H. 1977. Art and
Illusion.
Goodman, N. 1968. Languages of
Art.
Hübner, K.
1983. Critique of
Scientific Reason.
______, 1994.
Die zweite Schöpfung: Das Wirkliche in Kunst und Musik.
Jencks,
C. 1986. “Post-Moderne und Spät-Moderne.” In Koslowski, Spaemann, and Low,
eds., Moderne und Post-Moderne.
Vischer, F.
T. 1889. Das Schöne und die Kunst.
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